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A B S T R A C T
Private sector participation in urban rail transit has proliferated in the past two decades. The
large metropolises of East Asia have had decades of experience with private sector participation
in the provision of heavy metro services. The design of these public–private partnerships (PPP)
are varied. The diverse experiences of Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Beijing contain valuable
lessons for other cities. Using a case study approach, this paper discusses three features of urban
rail transit developments in the context of East Asian cities, viz., farebox recovery, land value
capture mechanisms, and vertical structure of the industry. Super vertical integration between
rail transit and real estate development as land value capture strategy to ﬁnance urban rail transit
has proven to be successful in Japanese cities and Hong Kong. Singapore’s experience illustrates
that vertically unbundled PPPs could cut oﬀ avenues for cross-subsidisation, reduce information
ﬂows as well as economies of scale and scope, introduce principal agent problems, and result in
underinvestment in capital stock and maintenance. We conclude that (i) a combination of high
farebox recovery ratios and successful land value capture contributed signiﬁcantly to the de-
velopment of urban rail transit in East Asia cities; (ii) given the complexities and high costs of
heavy metros, the optimal structure is a vertically integrated public-owned and driven system,
with the public sector entering into selective partnerships with the private sector where risk
sharing is clearly deﬁned and allocated.
1. Introduction
The number of urban rail transit systems built and under development have increased dramatically in recent years. The most rapid
growth has occurred in China where 23 cities built new transit lines between 2003 and 2014 (Zhang et al., 2016). In 2016, 51 urban
rail transit projects were reported to be in progress in China, with rapid growth in the number of projects forecasted for the future
(Wu, 2016).
Until the 1990s, most cities (with the exception of Japan) have used the state provision approach. Along with the growth in the
number of urban rail transit systems, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have proliferated in the past two decades (Chang, 2013; de
Jong et al., 2010; Phang, 2007; Yuan et al., 2010). Several of these are light rail-light metro initiatives (Mandri-Perrott, 2010). This
trend towards private sector participation follows that of utilities and other transport infrastructure sectors where capital investments
are hugely expensive. The PPP approach in urban rail development however involves consideration of numerous complex strategy
issues.
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In a PPP, the government remains the key partner and enters into a formal contractual arrangement with a private sector partner.
Very often, this is motivated by the possibility of bringing private ﬁnancing into the project. Fares, quality of service and safety
regulations are often embedded into the contract. The private sector brings both ﬁnancing as well as the beneﬁts of commercial
practices to enhance performance and contribute to the sustainability of the urban rail transit system. The private sector provides
specialised expertise, garnered from global experience, which is often lacking in the local public sector. This reduces learning costs,
can be more eﬃcient thus leading to lower costs. However, the public sector might not know how to structure and/or manage the PPP
relationship, the government can lose control over key decisions and transaction and governance costs can be much higher.
In the urban rail transit sector, the actual performance of PPPs as compared to the public sector has been mixed (Amaral, 2008;
Jain et al., 2008; Vining and Boardman, 2008; Iossa et al., 2014; Hong, 2016; Millones, 2010). Given the challenges posed by PPPs,
there are cities that have preferred not to enter into these partnerships. Regardless of mixed performance and in spite of complexities,
urban rail PPP is a growth industry and the private sector has built up much expertise in the past two decades. In East Asia, there are
numerous cities with large populations, high population densities and reliance on heavy metros. Cities such as Tokyo, Hong Kong,
Beijing, and Singapore all have diﬀerent heavy metro PPP models.
The focus of this paper is on three features of urban rail transit PPPs in the context of East Asian cities, viz., farebox recovery, land
value capture mechanisms, and vertical structure of the industry. The activities that could be vertically integrated (or separated) in
urban rail transit include the following: civil works; tracks, power distribution and signals; rolling stock; infrastructure maintenance;
train operations and maintenance; as well as property development around stations. These three distinctive features that make real
transit diﬀerent in East Asia are analysed in Section 2. Section 3 analyses how policy decisions regarding these important aspects of
urban rail help explain PPP design and performance in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Beijing. Section 4 draws lessons from these
case studies for other cities considering PPPs.
2. Distinctive features of urban rail transit development in East Asian cities
East Asian cities (and countries) diﬀer from most western cities (and countries) in size of metropolitan areas and population
densities. The capital and large cities of East Asia typically have populations well above 5 million, high population densities, motor
vehicle restriction measures in place, and high proportion of trips made by public transport. Public transport mode shares in Hong
Kong, Singapore, Seoul and Tokyo are in excess of 50 percent (Choi and Loh, 2013). These characteristics are favourable for large
scale urban rail developments, in particular heavy metro development. Mega populations and high train densities have several
implications for urban rail transit operations. In this section, we discuss three distinctive features of East Asian urban rail transit that
diﬀerentiate them from those in most U.S. and European cities, viz., high farebox recovery, successful land value capture, and vertical
structure of urban rail transit companies.
2.1. Fare revenue
Fare revenue and fare elasticity of transit demand are important aspects of urban rail transit sustainability. How fares are
structured and adjusted aﬀect transit demand, quality of transit services, proﬁtability, as well as subsidies required for the system.
The diﬀerence between operating costs of rail and passenger fare revenues, ranges from 29 to 89 percent for U.S. urban rail transit
systems (Parry and Small, 2009). It is generally rare for rail transit fare revenues to cover operation and maintenance costs in cities of
most Western developed countries and government subsidies are important in ﬁnancing both development and operations.
In the transport literature, the theoretical basis for subsidising transit operations on eﬃciency grounds is well established: scale
economies and externalities. Scale economies result in marginal costs of supply being lower than average costs. The sources of these
economies arise from the high ﬁxed costs of urban rail as well as the ‘Mohring eﬀect’ where passengers’ waiting time or access costs
decline as service frequency or route density increases (Mohring, 1972). Higher passenger density also permits higher vehicle oc-
cupancy thus reducing transit provider’s costs (Parry and Small, 2009). The second argument for transit subsidies is that the external
costs from automobile use is not fully internalized through environment or fuel taxes and congestion pricing.
In a study using 2002 transit data from three large metropolitan areas, viz. London, Los Angeles and Washington, Parry and Small
(2009) suggest that substantial transit operating subsidies (beyond 50% of operating costs) can be warranted on eﬃciency grounds.
At higher levels of incomes and corresponding higher time costs of commute, optimal transit subsidies and quality of transit service
are correspondingly higher. This arises from the shift in demand to automobile use with higher incomes, and in a context when
congestion and pollution from automobile use are not fully internalized.
The above eﬃciency arguments advanced for subsidising transit operations are however not as strong or valid in the context of
East Asian cities. Population and transit densities in many East Asian cities are high enough to support transit systems without the
need for operating subsidies, i.e. the ‘Mohring eﬀect’ is minimal. Farebox recovery ratios are in excess of one for transit systems in
Tokyo, Taipei, Singapore, Shanghai and Hong Kong (Singapore Land Transport Authority, 2011). In central Tokyo and Hong Kong,
for example, public transport mode share is in the region of 90 percent and public transport services operate without direct gov-
ernment subsidy (see Section 3). Governments have also been able to implement curbs on automobile ownership and usage through a
wide range of instruments which include vehicle ownership quotas, parking restrictions, congestion pricing, restrictions on usage as
well as fuel taxes (Phang, 2014). In cities where the congestion and polluting costs of motor vehicle usage are fully internalized, the
externalities argument for subsidising public transport is less valid. Instead, peak period crowdedness in train carriages is a major
problem in several cities and several operators have started time-based fare pricing strategies such as peak surcharges and oﬀ peak
discounts or fare free services to manage peak hour ridership demand (Gwee and Currie, 2013).
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Litman (2016) cites empirical evidence that rail transit fare elasticities for major cities tend to relatively low, in the−0.18 range
(−0.1 during peaks and −0.46 during oﬀ-peak). In East Asian cities, fare elasticities of public transport ridership are even lower if
there is little inter-modal competition and low car ownership rates. A study by Abe and Kato (2016) estimates fare elasticity of public
transport for Tokyo to be insigniﬁcant at−0.099 in the short run and −0.164 in the long run. With insigniﬁcant fare elasticities of
demand, fare revenues in East Asian cities are an important source of revenue for transit systems. Fares can be raised to increase
revenue to cover costs without the loss of passengers. Various fare adjustment systems have been devised in East Asian cities (see
Section 3 below) to enable transit agencies to raise fares periodically to cover rising costs and general inﬂation. The fare inelasticity of
demand also requires that fares be regulated to ensure that monopoly or market power is not abused and that fares remain aﬀordable
for lower income commuters.
2.2. Land value capture for ﬁnancing of urban transit development and operations
The idea of land value capture (LVC) dates back to Ricardo (1821), with George (1879) being the strongest advocate. As the
demand for a particular plot of land is derived from its facilitation of economic activities, land value is not only determined by its
intrinsic value or the original productivity of land, but also by other factors including population and economic growth, investments
in infrastructure and local services, as well as land use regulations. Land use planners can increase land value by allowing a change in
land use or permitting an increase in density (plot ratio or ﬂoor area ratio (FAR)). Governments can increase land value by investing
in infrastructure, providing local services and/or improving local amenities.
To help ﬁnance public sector investment in local infrastructure and other amenities, governments can use LVC instruments which
can be broadly classiﬁed into either tax or fee-based or development-based. The tax or fee-based category captures the increment of
land value through instruments such as property tax, betterment tax or tax increment ﬁnancing. The property tax is one of the most
important revenue sources for most developed countries. In the late nineteenth century, George (1879) had argued that as investment
in public goods can increase the aggregate land value by at least as much as the investment cost (under certain conditions), a 100%
tax on land value is not only eﬃcient, but also the only tax necessary to ﬁnance public expenditure (George’s single tax proposal).
Although George’s original land tax proposal was ﬂawed, the merits of the property tax are well recognised by economists (Friedman,
1978; Stiglitz, 1977). Property taxes can be introduced or increased to fund local infrastructure and services with minimal distortions
to the land market. The disadvantage however is that most property tax systems do not have clear links between infrastructure and
public service improvements and the tax rate. Not surprisingly, attempts to capture land value by linking the property tax rate to
improvements are often opposed by those aﬀected.
In contrast, development-based LVC often create opportunities for public, private, and even residents to share in the increment of
land value during the development and sometimes operation process. The government can increase land value by providing new
infrastructure, or changing land use regulations. Private as well as other stakeholders may also provide funds and resources to
participate in the development process. Both the public or private sectors can capture land value increment by selling or leasing land,
development or land use rights to other parties. It would be possible for stakeholders to negotiate to share the value increment based
on their respective share of contributions. The revenue sharing schemes are case dependent and agreed to in advance by all sta-
keholders.
Development-based LVC can be further categorised into sale of land or land leases, and retained developments. Receipts from sale
of land or land leases can be used to cover capital investments for urban rail investments. The urban rail authority can also retain
ownership of real estate developments that generate long term streams of revenues from leasing or rental of retail, commercial and
residential space as well as from parking charges. This provides for a steady long-term revenue stream that can be used to subsidise
operating expenses. By linking contributions to beneﬁts, development-based LVC leads to less ﬁscal distortion and has greater public
acceptance.
Local governments all over the world have implemented various LVC instruments to ﬁnance urban development projects. Walters
(2012) summarized the wide range of tax or fee-based LVC instruments and experiences of U.S. cities. In developing countries,
governments tend to use development-based LVC instruments as property tax systems are usually inadequate. In mainland China,
local governments acquire agriculture land at a relatively low costs, convert the land into urban use by building infrastructure and
then sell leases or land use rights (of up to 70-years) of the re-zoned land to developers through auctions and tenders. In India, local
governments rely on town planning schemes to acquire up to 40% of agricultural land from owners. Local governments reserve a
portion of the acquired land after building public infrastructure, and then sell the land via auction to cover development costs (Sanyal
and Deuskar, 2012). Cities in Brazil are mostly heavily urbanized with few opportunities for development-based LVC. Instead, local
governments capture land value by selling air rights. For example, the public sector in Sao Paulo deﬁnes the basic FAR (generally
from 1.0 to 2.0) and maximum allowable FAR (from 1.0 to 4.0) based on location and land use. Developers can enhance the density of
development projects by paying local governments for additional allowable FAR (Suzuki et al., 2015).
In theory, urban rail investment can increase land values by reducing residents’ commuting cost, increasing accessibility and
strengthening agglomeration beneﬁts (Alonso, 1964; Cervero et al., 1998; Chatman and Noland, 2011). Several empirical studies in
both developed and developing countries have shown that urban rail transit investments result in higher property values near stations
(Cervero and Landis, 1993; Duncan, 2011; Zhang and Wang, 2013; Zheng and Kahn, 2008).
The land value enhancement beneﬁts to existing property owners brought about by urban rail systems tend to be very signiﬁcant
in East Asian cities given the large numbers of transit commuters and high densities. The overall higher density of land use and
increase in population that are permissible from the development of urban metros constitute another important agglomeration
beneﬁt of urban rail systems in land scare cities. In traditional cost beneﬁt studies for evaluation or urban rail projects, travel time
Z. Chang, S.-Y. Phang Transportation Research Part A 105 (2017) 106–122
108
savings is a major component of beneﬁts. Travel time savings become capitalized as land value enhancement and the latter is
therefore not included as a beneﬁt item as it would theoretically lead to double counting. Also the beneﬁts from land value en-
hancements and increased land use density along the rail corridor are regarded as transfers as there could be corresponding re-
ductions in density/land values elsewhere in the city. However, in the case of land scarce and large East Asian metropolises, by
allowing for higher density developments, urban rail leads to a relaxation of a very real supply side space constraint where ag-
glomeration economies are important (Phang, 2000, 2003).
Several East Asian cities have recognised this important beneﬁt of urban transit and LVC techniques are often applied to ﬁnance
urban rail project construction (and sometimes for operation and maintenance costs as well). Cities such as Tokyo and Hong Kong
apply the LVC technique directly to ﬁnance their urban transit development projects, while in Singapore and mainland China, the
capture of land value from rail infrastructure projects is indirectly via government ownership of land and sale of long term land leases
to developers.
Most transit systems in the world run operation deﬁcits. In contrast, railway companies in Hong Kong and Tokyo make substantial
proﬁts (see Section 3 below for the case studies). Both cities apply LVC instruments to cover a signiﬁcant proportion of transit
investment, operation and maintenance costs (Cervero, 1998; Cervero and Murakami, 2009). The public sector in most cities in
Mainland China build and operate entire urban rail systems. A few cities such as Beijing, Shenzhen, and Hangzhou have applied PPP
models with operations of PPP lines contracted to private companies.
In mainland China, revenue from land leasing for many cities account for between one third and two thirds of the annual budget.
Fig. 1 shows the increase in aggregate land leasing revenue from RMB 0.59 trillion in 2004 to RMB 3.34 trillion in 2015. However,
this increase is not sustainable for two reasons: ﬁrst, land resources on the fringes of urban areas are scare and will be exhausted in
the near future. Secondly, land leasing revenues are largely dependent on the real estate market. Recessions and government in-
terventions to cool housing markets could reduce land leasing revenues (Chang, 2014).
As the property tax and capital gains tax systems are not well established in China, most of the land value increment from urban
rail system developments were previously captured by households. With the decline in land leasing revenues, several cities have
started to apply fee-based and development-based LVC for urban development. Since 2011, Shanghai and Chongqing have introduced
property taxes. The property tax rate in Shanghai is 0.6% of value. The ﬁrst residence purchased by a local resident household (with
Shanghai hukou) is exempted from this tax.2 The property tax rate in Chongqing ranges from 0.5% to 1.2%, depending on the
magnitude of value increment of purchased properties in the past two years.3 Although there is no clear schedule, more Chinese cities
are likely to introduce the property tax when land leasing revenues decline further in the future.
Besides tax-based LVC eﬀorts, Chinese cities such as Nanchang have implemented development-based LVC. Nanchang, the capital
city of Jiangxi province, has a population of 5.3 million in 2015. Due to rapid urbanization, the city government plans to build ﬁve
metro lines by 2020. The construction of the ﬁrst line began in 2012; operations started in September 2015 with a route length of
29 km and 24 stations. The construction of the second line started in 2013 and it is expected to begin operations in late 2016. To
ﬁnance the metro system, the city government is applying the Hong Kong LVC model (see Section 3 below). The state owned subway
company acquires land at relatively low prices through exercise of eminent domain. After acquisition, the city land use planners
increase the FAR and change land use around and above stations. The development rights are then sold to developers to ﬁnance
construction costs. The subway company can also develop retail, residential units and provide other public amenities and services in
the areas near and above the metro railway stations. Revenues from rental or sale of leases of these properties are used to cover
investment and operating costs (Suzuki et al., 2015). It is still premature to conclude that the LVC practice in Nanchang has worked
well. If it is successful, more mainland Chinese cities will likely follow the development-based LVC model for urban rail systems in the
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Fig. 1. China’s aggregate land leasing revenue (2004–2015, RMB trillion).
Source: Ministry of Land and Resources, People’s Republic of China. Access at: http://www.mlr.gov.cn/.
2 Shanghai’s tax policies can be found at the Shanghai government website at: http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw2319/nw10800/nw11407/
nw25262/u26aw24523.html.
3 Chongqing’s tax policies can be found at China’s State Council Information Oﬃce website at: http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/gssxwfbh/xwfbh/chongqing/
document/857648/857648.htm.
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future.
2.3. Vertical structure
Vertical separation in network industries refers to the institutional separation of the infrastructure from the operations. A large
body of literature exist that analyses the experience with vertical separation (e.g. Vickers, 1995; Sappington, 2006), with con-
siderable attention devoted to reforms in the electricity, gas and telecommunications sectors. In Europe, the vertical structure of
railways has also been a source of theoretical and policy debate as well as experimentation in the past two decades (Marcucci, 2002).
From the 1950s, the most common structure in the rail sectors of most countries (other than Japan) was a single, state-owned
enterprise. The restructuring of rail in a number of countries began after the vertical separation, and subsequent or simultaneous
privatization of the telecommunication, electricity, and gas industries beginning in the 1980s. However, while separation was
considered an unequivocal success in the electricity and telecommunication sectors, it remains a controversial issue in the railway
sector. Overall, the ﬁndings are that the merits of vertical separation for railways are inconclusive and dependent on circumstances
and the way the system is managed (Drew and Nash, 2011).
In the urban rail sector, relatively little attention has been paid to the vertical structure of the industry. For many large cities,
intercity or suburban railways also constitute an important segment of urban rail transit. This analysis therefore draws also from the
relevant literature on the structure of the railway sector. Similar to the railway sector, urban rail transit infrastructure can be
separated as a monopoly, and either owned or regulated by the government. Competition can be introduced into the operations of
trains through competitive tendering. The breaking up a vertically integrated monopoly opens up the industry to competition and
PPPs which can enhance performance. However, such separation requires the infrastructure owner to supervise the coordination of
track and trains when diﬀerent companies are involved.
Amaral and Thiebaud (2015) identiﬁes four main modes of vertical structure for European railway sector:
• Full unbundle: full separation between infrastructure manager (IM) and railway undertakings (RU).
• Unbundle with delegation: separation between IM and RU, where IM delegates infrastructure maintenance and operational man-
agement to a RU.
• Unbundle with holding: separation where a holding company owns the IM and the RU.
• Full bundle: a unique ﬁrm operates infrastructure management and rail services.
Various vertical structures can be found in urban transit systems and in PPP designs. Horizontal separation could involve regional
separation of operations, such as with diﬀerent lines being awarded to diﬀerent operators. Tables 1 and 2 present diﬀerent com-
binations of vertical integration/unbundling and privatization. Table 1 shows metropolitan areas which operate vertically integrated
systems. Row A of Table 1 shows examples of vertically integrated and state-owned systems such as the system in Paris. Similarly,
most urban rail transit systems in the US are vertically integrated and state-owned. Shanghai and Taipei have resisted vertical
separation and privatization and are fully public sector owned and operated.
Row B of Table 1 shows cities where the urban rail system is operated by a combination of public and private companies, such as
in Tokyo and Seoul. The Tokyo system is a mixed system with some lines operated by the public sector and others by private
vertically integrated companies which are conglomerate companies. Row C of Table 1 shows the Hong Kong MTR which is a pri-
vatised vertically integrated regulated monopoly in Hong Kong. It is a hybrid ownership company that is majority owned by the Hong
Kong government and also listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange.
Both Tokyo and Hong Kong are exceptional in the degree of vertical integration as well as extent of privatization - both cities have
vertically integrated privatized companies which are also involved in real estate developments served by rail transit. The advantages
of vertical integration from rail to real estate development is evident from the discussion on LVC in the previous section and from the
growing literature on transit oriented development. This organisation form was already utilised from the early twentieth century in
Japan where both urbanization and urban rail development were driven by private railway companies which were able to develop
real estate as a non-rail proﬁt centre. During the post-war high growth period, Japanese private railways developed into powerful
Table 1
Vertically integrated urban rail transit systems.
Structure Finance & build
infrastructure
Finance and own
rolling stock
Maintain
infrastructure
Operate train
services
Examples
A. Public sector vertically integrated Public sector US cities, Paris,
Shanghai, Taipei
B. Coexistence of public and private
vertically integrated, horizontally
separated companies
Public sector Tokyo, Seoul
Private sector conglomerates
C. Privatised as vertically integrated
monopoly including real estate
development
MTR is listed on the stock exchange but Hong Kong government is the majority
shareholder
Hong Kong
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conglomerate corporations with wide range of real estate developments near stations (Cervero, 1998).
In contrast to the super-vertical integration of urban rail transit in Japanese cities and Hong Kong, vertically separated systems
have been adopted in several other cities. Table 2 illustrates the heterogeneity of vertical and horizontal separation that have been
utilised to facilitate PPPs in urban rail transit. Row A of Table 2 shows examples of systems where the public sector owns rail
infrastructure and rolling stock assets and privatise operations and maintenance functions as in Stockholm. Stockholm’s T-bana was a
pioneer in vertical separation. Stockholm’s metro operating concessions are designed to be of relatively short durations (5–10 years);
the public sector company owns the infrastructure as well as trains, the operating company is responsible only for operations. In the
mid-1990s, three separate operating franchises for three lines were oﬀered for bidding on short 5 year contracts. In 1999, the model
was changed to a 10-year operating franchise for uniﬁed operation of the system, with the French transport company CGEA winning
the bid (White and Ball, 2002). In 2009, Hong Kong MTR won the concession to run the Stockholm metro for 8 years, with a possible
six-year extension. The Latin American concessions which required the private sector to make or administer substantial investments
were of longer durations of 20–25 years (Phang, 2007, 2009).
Row B of Table 2 shows the London Tube PPPs where in 2003, London separated out ownership of the infrastructure and awarded
them to two private companies to upgrade and maintain. The infraco PPPs for the Tube ended in costly failure, with Transport for
London (TfL) acquiring the failed concessionaire Metronet in 2007 (Vining and Boardman, 2008) and the second PPP contractor Tube
Lines in 2010. The failed London infracos (2003–2010) remain the sole example of vertical separation where the urban rail transit
infrastructure was separated and privatized through PPPs.
Row C of Table 2 shows mixed systems for cities which have experimented with PPPs selectively. The government remains the key
driver but introduces PPPs for one or more lines. The government may retain ownership and ﬁnancing of infrastructure and may
award one or more lines to the private sector to operate. It may award a line to be built as a Design-Build-Finance-Operate PPP while
retaining the existing system within the public sector. As such, some lines are operated by the public sector while other lines are
operated by PPPs. There are numerous examples of such mixed systems where PPP operations co-exist alongside public sector
operators. Cities with such mixed systems include Beijing, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, Seoul, London and Bangkok.
In China, Beijing Line No. 4 was the ﬁrst rail transit PPP which was built in time for the 2008 Olympics (Chang, 2013). The private
sector partner is the Hong Kong MTR. Beijing No. 4 Metro Line PPP has become the model followed for other urban rail PPP projects
in China, such as in Hangzhou and Shenzhen. In 2009, the Seoul Metropolitan City government granted a PPP to build and operate
Line 9 (one of nine Seoul lines) to a consortium of private companies (Hong, 2016). The other Seoul lines as well as Korea’s urban rail
transit systems in another ﬁve cities are owned and operated by the public sector. Vertically integrated Design-Build-Finance-Operate
PPP strategy to procure new lines (especially light rail-light metros) has also been used in several other cities such as London and
Bangkok (Phang, 2007, 2009; Mandri-Perrott, 2010).
In contrast to mixed public and PPP rail systems shown in Row C of Table 2, Row D shows the case of Singapore which has relied
exclusively on private sector companies to operate trains services (see Section 3.3).
How are we able to understand and explain the mixed empirical evidence for vertical structures in the urban rail transit sector as
show in Tables 1 and 2?
In the vertical integration literature of the ﬁrm, two leading theories are the transaction cost approach of Williamson (1975, 1985)
and the property rights approach of Grossman and Hart (1986). Hart (2003) also highlights the close parallel between the theory of
the ﬁrm and the theory of privatization in the aspect of vertical integration as both are concern with whether to regulate a re-
lationship via an arms-length contract or via a transfer of ownership. While the theory of ﬁrm takes an ‘incomplete contracting’
perspective in which ineﬃciencies arise because it is hard to foresee and contract for all possible outcomes for the long term, the
focus of the theory of privatization has focused more on moral hazard and asymmetric information.
The arguments in favour of vertical separation, using Williamson’s theory, include the following: separation facilitates compe-
tition in the non-monopoly segment. It follows the practice in other transport sectors, such as separation of airport from airlines,
railway tracks from railway companies. It allows companies to specialise and it facilitates greater transparency of capital costs for
Table 2
Heterogeneity in separation structure of urban rail transit systems.
Structure Infrastructure
ownership and
ﬁnance
Finance and own
rolling stock
Maintain infrastructure Operate train
services
Examples
A. Public sector owns all assets,
private sector operates and
maintains
Public Private Stockholm, Latin
American cities
B. London Infraco PPPs Private Public Private Public London (2003–2010)
C. Predominately public sector owned
and operated, with limited PPPs
for selected lines/functions
Public Some lines are run by private operators, others by public sector; this
allows for useful performance comparison of lines operated by the
public sector
Beijing, Hangzhou,
Shenzhen Seoul,
London, Bangkok
Private DBFOs (selected lines)
D. Public sector owns infrastructure
assets, private sector owns rolling
stock, operates and maintains
Public Two private train operators Singapore (2000–2016)
Z. Chang, S.-Y. Phang Transportation Research Part A 105 (2017) 106–122
111
regulatory purposes. It also facilitates privatization (which, according to Preston (2002), should be considered a political rather than
an economic advantage in the British context).
However, from both the transaction costs and property rights perspectives, there are equally strong arguments against vertical
separation. Both theories emphasize incomplete contracts and opportunistic behaviour from relationship-speciﬁc investments. With a
fragmented system, there could be loss of economies from higher coordination costs. If there is greater asset speciﬁcity and holdup is
costly (which is certainly the case for urban rail transit), then vertical integration should be favoured from the transaction costs
perspective. The property rights approach on the other hand focuses on incomplete contracts resulting in bargaining power bestowed
by ownership and control of key assets. The ownership of assets becomes a way of allocating residual rights of control not speciﬁed in
the incomplete contract and thus aﬀects ex ante investment incentives. Safety and quality of service could also be compromised if
transfer of ownership via privatization aﬀects incentives to invest.
Helm and Thompson (1991) have argued that where industries have sunk costs, if price cap regulation is utilised, it may con-
tribute to under-investment. This applies to capital investment in new lines, station redevelopment, track capital investment as well
as rolling stock investment. There could be information asymmetry between regulators, infrastructure owners and multiple train
operating companies that can be undesirable. The failure of Railtrack in Great Britain as well as the failure of the London Under-
ground Infracos serve to illustrate the challenges of vertical separation in privatization of railway and urban transit, respectively.
Amaral and Thiebaud (2015) use the French rail sector example to identify coordination costs as a drawback of separation. They
develop a model to explain why ineﬃcient outcomes may arise when vertically separated ﬁrms have to commit ex ante on quantities.
Their results indicate that credible and eﬀective price regulation can overcome the limits of separation on the infrastructure side.
However, if the market is not ﬂexible enough, and as the downstream market becomes more competitive, it may be harder for railway
undertakings to sustain an equilibrium with high output.
White and Ball (2002) review practices in Europe and ﬁnd the dominant structural model for European Metros to be the vertically
integrated monopoly entity. For cities with more than one metro company, separation tended to be horizontal rather than vertical.
There are examples of part of services being vertically separated, with a number of diﬀerent models ranging from limited tendering to
open competition for operations or infrastructure.
Japanese cities have had experience with both vertically integrated and vertically separated urban rail transit systems. In a study
of the vertically separated Kobe rail transit system, Mizutani and Shoji (2004) conclude that vertically separated systems do not have
signiﬁcant advantages over vertically integrated systems in terms of maintenance costs of infrastructure.
In their survey of railway structural separation policies in 23 OECD countries from 1994 to 2007, Mizutani and Uranishi (2013)
ﬁnd massive (passenger-freight and regional) horizontal separation to have been adopted in UK and Japan, vertical integration to be
the structure of choice in Japan while vertical separation is the common policy in the European Union. Many variations of vertical
separation exist including functional accounting separation, organisational separation of rail and infrastructure, or organisational
separation involving a holding company. They ﬁnd that passenger-freight separation appears to lower a railway’s costs, while the
eﬀects of vertical separation is dependent on train density of a railway organisation. Vertical separation with lower train density tend
to reduce total cost of a railway organisation but as train density increases, vertical separation causes total costs to increase. In
particular, governance costs for unbundled systems increase rapidly with higher density of usage as operations become more and
more complex. The policy implication is that rail organisations with higher train density should choose to be vertically integrated to
lower costs, while it may be preferable for those with lower train density to choose vertical separation.
The role of technology intensity in driving vertical integration could be another explanatory factor. This argument draws from
Acemoglu et al. (2010) whose focus is on the relative importance of technological investments between a producer and supplier in a
bilateral relationship in the context of manufacturing ﬁrms. Their framework highlights that backward vertical integration gives
greater investment incentives to the producer, while forward vertical integration encourages supplier investment. A higher im-
portance of producer’s technology intensity should increase the probability of backward integration, and a higher importance of
supplier’s technology should reduce that probability.
These insights for vertical structure of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector can provide insights into variations in vertical structure
and urban rail PPP designs that have developed in diﬀerent cities. In the urban rail transit sector, we can consider the producer to be
the real estate owner or developer, the supplier to be the urban rail service provider. In cities where real estate density is much lower,
such as Stockholm and other European cities, the technology intensity as well as LVC beneﬁts of real estate developments are diﬀused
and may not be greater than the technology intensity of urban rail services, thus reducing the beneﬁts and probability of integration.
In East Asian settings, the very high density of real estate developments and large LVC beneﬁts imply high technology intensity of the
real estate producer relative to urban rail service provider and increases the probability of vertical integration between real estate and
urban rail service provider. The real estate company integrates backward to own the railway company (the upstream supplier) to
encourage investment in rail accessibility.
3. PPP design and performance of urban rail in selected East Asian cities
Despite several common characteristics, East Asian cities have adopted diﬀerent models of private sector participation in urban
rail development and operations. In this section, we review the experiences of Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Beijing to illustrate
diﬀerent PPP approaches, with particular focus on fare revenue risks, land value capture strategies and vertical structure of the rail
sector and their impact on performance of the urban rail sector.
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3.1. Tokyo
The Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan area is the largest urban agglomeration in the world with an estimated population of 38
million. Covering a land area of 8500 square kilometres, the average population density is around 4400 per square kilometres
(Demographia, 2016). Rail is the primary transport mode and the Tokyo rail network consists of more than 3500 kilometres of dense
and highly integrated commuter rail and subway lines. Tokyo is served by 48 rail transit companies operating public, semiprivate,
private and privatised passenger lines (Suzuki et al., 2015). The subway system is primarily run by two operators – Toei Subway
which is owned by the Metropolitan Bureau of Transportation, and Tokyo Metro which was privatized in 2004. The subway system is
only a fraction of Tokyo’s heavy rail transit network. The privatised East Japan Railway Company (JR East) is the biggest rail operator
in Tokyo. Several other private railway companies also operate in Tokyo, of which the major ones are Keiyu, Keio, Keisei, Odakyu,
Tobu, Seibu, and Tokyu.
Fare regulation: Rail operators require a government licence to operate and all fares and fare adjustments require the approval of
the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. The Ministry approves a fare cap or ceiling based on the full cost recovery
principle plus a yardstick competition scheme. The rail fare should cover costs and private railway companies are not expected to
receive subsidies. Under yardstick regulation, the Ministry benchmarks costs using three categories of rail services: major private
railways, Japan Railways, and subway systems (Shoji, 2005).
As rail fares are regulated and kept at aﬀordable levels, railway companies found it necessary and were also encouraged by the
government to expand into other businesses in order to remain proﬁtable. Private conglomerates such as Tokyu, Odakyu, Keio and
Seibu started as railway companies and developed into rail based conglomerates with businesses in real estate development, retail,
bus operations, hotels, sports stadiums, amusement parks, electrical power generation, etc. (Cervero, 1998). This has allowed Tokyo’s
railway companies to cross-subsidise low proﬁt railways and bus enterprises with proﬁts from real estate development. The
strengthened balance sheet from real estate proﬁts allow rail expansion ﬁnancing on favourable terms and within the consortia
themselves, if necessary.
Land value capture: As land and most railway companies are private-owned, the instruments used for urban rail development are
consensus and market-based. Although diﬀerent LVC techniques are applied in diﬀerent cases, the two main instruments used are
through land readjustment and urban redevelopment schemes (Suzuki et al., 2015). Land readjustment is usually applied in urban
fringes, where property rights are fragmented. The development entities acquire irregular agriculture land at lower prices but return
smaller but fully serviced residential and commercial land parcels to the original owners. The ‘surplus’ land is used to develop public
services such as roads, open space, sidewalks or sold to developers to cover part of development costs. Generally, the government will
need to subsidise some development costs, however, there are substantial land acquisition cost savings. The land readjustment
method is more horizontal based without signiﬁcant increase in FAR. After one or two generations, the original urban edge could
become sub-centres of cities.
New infrastructure is needed to facilitate high density districts in more central areas of the city. Development entities apply LVC
through the urban redevelopment schemes to ﬁnance urban transit. Urban redevelopment LVC is more vertically based. The city
planner generally increases the FAR for the redevelopment land and change the land use to mixed use. The new development projects
will accommodate the original land owners, but also provide more residential, commercial or oﬃce space for sale or lease. The
revenue can be used to cover redevelopment costs. Development entities need to oﬀer strong economic incentives to original
landowners, and more stakeholders will be involved. Certainly, the LVC through redevelopment scheme is more complex and time-
consuming as compared to land readjustment. The income contributions from LVC (real estate, business services, etc.) vary among
transit companies, mostly ranging from 20 to 60 percent (Suzuki et al., 2015).
Industry structure: In summary, the Japanese urban rail transit development explicitly recognises the land value increment beneﬁts
brought about by rail. City planners have successfully implemented the co-development of rail and new communities that involved
private sector consortiums of various sizes. Most are vertically integrated, providing service operation on infrastructure they owned.
Most also engage in a multitude of other businesses in the vicinity of rail lines to increase their rail ridership. This has allowed the
positive beneﬁts created by rail to be internalized to directly fund rail development. Fares are regulated and private consortiums are
able to cross-subsidise their less proﬁtable rail business with other more proﬁtable businesses that rely on the passenger movement
generated by the railway line. The physical integration of rail stations with the surrounding real estate development is also much
more seamless when both are jointly owned. It is apparent from rail and real estate developments in Tokyo that the motivations for
relentless super vertical integration are much stronger when ﬁrms are private rather than public.
3.2. Hong Kong
Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated place in the world. By 2015, 7.32 million residents lived in a total land area of
1108 square kilometres. As 80% of the city is mountainous, the built up area only accounts for 24% of the total land area, and only
7% of that area is for residential uses (Planning Department of Hong Kong, 2015). Due to the limited land and high population
density, the government promoted public transportation and controlled the growth of private cars by charging various fees and taxes
as well as limiting car parking spaces (Tang and Lo, 2008). By 2015, there were 567,886 licensed private cars in the city (Trans-
portation Department of Hong Kong, 2015), and this number is only 7.8% of Hong Kong’s population.
Over 90% of daily trips are by public transport which includes buses, urban railway, tramways, ferries etc. The average daily
number of passenger trips by public transportation was 12.6 million in 2015, with around 43% of those trips by rail (Transport
Department of Hong Kong, Annual Transport Digest 2016). The government plans the urban rail transit system, while the railway
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lines are built and operated by the Mass Transit Railway Corporation Limited (MTRCL), a quasi-private transit company with 75% of
the company’s shares owned by public. To date, the railway network in Hong Kong includes 11 lines with route length of 249 km and
158 stations.
Fare regulation: Proﬁts from rail transport operations are mainly from fare revenue, and these have grown steadily over the years.
The adult fares range from HKD 3.6 to HKD 52.6 depending on distance. Fares for the Airport Express Line are signiﬁcantly higher.
Concessionary fares are usually half the adult fare applied to child and senior citizen. MTRCL has also oﬀered concessionary fares for
the disabled since 2009. The fare rate is adjusted every year, based on three factors: fares to reﬂect Hong Kong’s economic conditions,
address public concerns on aﬀordability, and generate suﬃcient revenues to support railway operations. The government imposes a
fare adjustment formula that caps the overall annual fare increase based on the following formula:
= × + × −Fare Adjustment Rate (0.5 CCPI) (0.5 NWI(TS)) Productivity Factor
where:
• CCPI is the year-on-year percentage change in composite consumer price index.
• NWI(TS) is the year-on-year percentage change in nominal wage index for the transport sector.
• Productivity Factor is a pre-determined factor (set at 0.6% for 2013 to 2017).4
In 2015, the median monthly income for all employees in Hong Kong was HKD 15,500 (Hong Kong SAR Government Census and
Statistic Department, 2015). The 2015 average fare rate per trip for domestic service and Airport Express were HKD 7.49 and HKD
60.42 respectively.5 The current fare rates are considered aﬀordable for most residents.
Land value capture: Land is owned by government and developers acquire leasehold land for development through public auctions
or tenders. Urban transit development projects come under the Rail Plus Property (R+P) system rather than leasehold system. The
MTRCL acquires the development right over the land around or on top of railway stations with a market price before ‘rail’, and sell or
lease the completed development projects at the market price after ‘rail’ (Cervero and Murakami, 2009). Through implementing R+P
programs, MTRCL has been able to capture the land value increment due to the accessibility and agglomeration beneﬁts brought by
railway projects. MTRCL often builds a partnership with private developers for property development in the catchment area of
railway stations. Both parties share development revenues and costs, and the sharing schemes are negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
As a result, near 60% of MTRCL’s annual net proﬁts in recent years has been from LVC.
Industry structure: Hong Kong’s R+P urban transit organisation structure can be considered to be modelled after Tokyo’s super-
vertically integrated railway conglomerates – except that the MTRCL is the owner and operator of the entire railway network.
Historically, there were two railway operators in Hong Kong - the Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC) and MTR
Corporation (MTRC). The KCRC primarily provided transit service for the suburban area and accommodated the growing population
in new town developments (Jain et al., 2008). MTRC provided eﬃcient transit services mainly in the urban area. Although owned by
the government, both corporations operated under prudent commercial principles and often undertook real estate development over
stations and captured the land value increment. By the end of 1990s, MTRC had become one of the most eﬃcient and proﬁtable
railway systems in the world.
To further promote eﬃciency and introduce market discipline to the running of railway, the government made preparations to
partially privatize MTRC in 1999. In February 2000, the legislature approved the Mass Transit Railway Ordinance under which all the
asset and liabilities of MTRC would be vested into a limited company MTRCL, which was awarded an exclusive franchise for
50 years.6 The government was required to hold at least 50% of shares in the next 20 years. In October 2000, the privatized MTRC
was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The oﬀer price was set at between HKD 8 to HKD 9.38 and the price soared to HKD 13
on the day the stock began trading (Ho, 2001). Through selling 20% of the company, the government raised over HKD 10 billion.
The government still holds 75% of the company’s shares as of September 2016. As the biggest shareholder, the government can
direct the PPP ﬁrm to work for the broader public interests. The government can appoint the CEO and determine the board com-
position. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong has also granted a special waiver for MTRCL not to be strictly in compliance with the rule
applicable for other commercial entities for transactions involving the government. The partial privatization also facilitated MTRCL’s
entrepreneurship and overseas involvement in metro construction and operations.
In 2007, KCRC was merged with MTRCL, and the entire railway network was integrated into the quasi-private ﬁrm. Since then,
MTRCL has become one of the most important entities in Hong Kong; it provides high quality transit services, promotes Transit
Oriented Development as well as new town development, and shapes the landuse landscape in Hong Kong. The recent stock price of
MTRCL (Aug-Oct 2016) was around HKD 43 per share.7 The company’s revenues are from fares, LVC, and its global business
operations. Table 3 summarizes the main sources of MTRCL’s proﬁts.
MTRCL’s proﬁts from LVC include property development, property rental and management, and Hong Kong station commercial
4 See Hong Kong SAR Government Transport Department website at: http://www.td.gov.hk/ﬁlemanager/en/util_uarticle_cp/fam%20-%20consultation%20paper
%20-%20e%20-%20ﬁnal.pdf.
5 MTR Annual Report 2015 at Hong Kong MTR website: http://www.mtr.com.hk/archive/corporate/en/investor/MTR_2015%20Annual_Eng%20analyst
%20(slide)%20Final.pdf.
6 Details of the arrangements can be found in the legislative council brief (Mass Transit Railway Bill), see http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/bc/bc01/
general/bc01_brf.htm.
7 See MTRCL website at: http://www.mtr.com.hk/en/corporate/investor/shareservices.html.
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business. Proﬁts from property development varies each year, depending on the scale of development projects. Proﬁts from property
rental and commercial business in stations have increased steadily along with the size of MTRCL’s property portfolio. Overall, proﬁts
from LVC contribute 50–60% share of total proﬁts in recent years, with the revenues also dependent on the health of the real estate
market.
The third part of the company’s proﬁts is from its global business. From 2007, MTRCL began providing railway services in
Mainland China and cities in other countries. By the end of 2015, MTRC was operating 11 railway lines in Beijing, Shenzhen,
Hangzhou, London, Stockholm, and Melbourne under various PPP arrangements. Another 4 lines in Beijing, Stockholm and Sydney
are under construction and preparation (MTR Annual Report 2015). Indeed, revenues from its global business accounted for over
30% of total revenues since 2010. As MTRC needed to provide equity investment in several PPP lines, its proﬁts from global op-
erations are relatively small and exposed to exchange risks. As more lines begin operations, MTRC’s global business is likely to
contribute more signiﬁcantly to its proﬁts.
Overall, the ﬁnancial performance of MTRCL is robust and sound. Its business portfolio is diversiﬁed through LVC and through its
global business. The local fare revenue is relatively stable without much risk. LVC proﬁts are currently 60% of total proﬁts, though
LVC proﬁts are dependent on the health of the real estate market. MRTCL’s excellent ﬁnancial performance has generated beneﬁts for
the general public in the form of aﬀordable fares as well as contributions to government coﬀers. As the biggest shareholder, the
government still holds over 4.434 billion shares in 2016. Based on the annual dividend per share since 2000, we estimate that the
government received a total HKD 51 billion in nominal dividend income.8
Besides direct ﬁnancial beneﬁts for the public, MTRCL has also generated social beneﬁts though the magnitude of this is hard to
quantify. Urban rail trips as a percentage of all public transport trips increased from 31.4% in 2001 to 42.5% in 2015.9 The increased
ridership on MTR is associated with a reduction in air pollution, road congestion, and energy consumption. The Transit Oriented
Development (TOD) promoted by MTRCL increased density and reduced sprawl. The improved accessibility and amenity created in
TOD districts led to appreciation in land values. Cervero and Murakami (2009) provide evidence of rent premiums around three MTR
stations. Rent premiums is a good measure of the highest and best use of land development created by MTRCL.
In summary, the success of MTRCL depends on the super vertical integration of the R+P system. At the city level, the extra-
ordinary density requires an eﬃcient transportation system. By integrating transport and land use planning, railway was viewed as
the backbone of the public transit system. Indeed, MTRCL serves as the intermediary between the public and private. Due to its
dominant public position, it serves broader public objectives on town planning, promotes TOD, and provides transit services at
aﬀordable rates. Through R+P, MTRCL integrated the railway into residential and commercial developments. This integration
creates synergy between property development and railway patronage. MTRCL captures the land value increment through property
development and management, and provides better accessibility for residents living in properties adjacent to stations. Several modern
shopping malls within stations are attractive for both local and non-local consumers. Both residents and consumers in turn increase
the patronage of MTRCL. The enormous value created by MTRCL has to be attributed to public sector dominance in this super
vertically integrated PPP design.
3.3. Singapore
Singapore is an island city-state with a land area of about 718 square kilometres and a population of 5.5 million. It was a former
British colony which became self-governing in 1959, joined the Malaysian federation in 1963, and became an independent republic in
1965. Singapore was the ﬁrst city in the world to introduce road congestion pricing in 1975 and a motor vehicle ownership quota in
1990 (Phang, 2014). The resulting high costs of motor vehicle ownership and usage has resulted in public transport being the default
mode choice for the majority of commuters.
Fare aﬀordability, quality, and reliability of public transport services are therefore very important for the majority of residents
and accorded much policy attention. The rail network, currently about 200 km, will be extended to 280 km by around 2020. The
Land Transport Authority (LTA), a Ministry of Transport agency, plans, ﬁnances, builds and owns the rail infrastructure. Train
Table 3
Hong Kong MTRCL: Operating proﬁt contributions (2011–2015).
Source: MTRCL Financial Highlights. Access at: http://www.mtr.com.hk/archive/corporate/en/investor/images/MTR042_Operation%20Proﬁt.pdf.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Transport Operation (HKD Billion) 6.2 6.5 6.7 7 7.2
Property Development (HKD Billion) 4.9 3.2 1.4 4.2 2.9
Property Rental and Management (HKD Billion) 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.7
Commercial Business (HKD Billion) 3.1 3.3 4.1 4.5 4.8
Global Business 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6
Others 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Total Proﬁts (HKD Billion) 17.2 16.5 16.3 20.1 19.3
8 The dividend history of MTRC can be found at: https://www.mtr.com.hk/en/corporate/investor/shareservices.html.
9 The share of railway trips in total public transit trips is calculated from data in government reports for various years. Access at: http://www.td.gov.hk/en/
publications_and_press_releases/publications/free_publications/annual_transport_digest/index.html.
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operating and maintenance (including infrastructure maintenance) licenses have been awarded to two companies, SMRT and SBS
Transit.
Fare regulation: Transit fares (for both rail and bus) are regulated by the Public Transport Council (PTC), an independent public
agency established by parliament in 1987. Since 1998, the PTC has utilised a price cap formula to regulate fare increases of transit
operators. However, transit operators are still required to submit annual fare revision applications to the PTC each year, with the PTC
having the discretion to approve the amount and structure of the increase. The price cap formula and the value of ‘x’ is valid for a
ﬁxed number of years and subject to periodic review. Table 4 shows the changes to the formula and to ‘x’, the resulting fare cap and
the allowed fare adjustments over time.
Until the restructuring of the public transport sector beginning in 2015 to a government contracting model, the two private
licensed transit operators were required to bear full fare-box revenue risks, with minimum standards for service delivery and uni-
versal service obligations regulated by the government agencies. In addition to fares being capped by the formula, actual fare
increases are approved by the PTC and for the 14-year period, between 1998 and 2011, approved fare increase equal the cap
permitted by the fare formula in only two years, 2005 and 2006 (see Table 4). Fare adjustment arrangements in Singapore exposed
private sector operators to full revenue risks as well as policy risks when allowed fare increases often fell short of the cap. The PTC
also face the regulatory challenge of having a single price cap to regulate two ﬁrms with diﬀerent cost structures as the modal mix of
bus and train as well as operations diﬀered.
Land value capture: Like the Hong Kong government, the Singapore government is also the largest landowner and auctions land to
private developers periodically through its government land sales programme (Phang, 1996; Hui and Ho, 2004). Unlike Hong Kong’s
MTRCL which is also a property development company, the Singapore operators did not have the same access to transit oriented real
estate development opportunities. Singapore does not apply development based LVC directly for urban transit development - if we
were to use a narrow interpretation. Instead, the public sector captures the land value increment largely through fee-based LVC
including land leasing, property tax and development charge. Land sales revenues are channelled to a speciﬁc fund - “past reserves”,
and reserves are not permitted to be used to ﬁnance the current government’s expenditure without the permission of the President.10
The reserves are invested and 50% of net investment returns is taken into the government’s general budget for spending. The rail
infrastructure is built and owned by the LTA. The government ﬁnances LTA’s budget including rail projects from its general budget
Table 4
Singapore’s Public Transport Council fare cap regulation.
Sources: Looi and Choi (2016, pp. 93–99), Phang (2016), Gomez-Ibanez and Gan (2016) and Singapore Public Transport Council (https://www.ptc.gov.sg/).
Year Fare cap formula x% Fare cap PTC approved increase%
Bus Rail Overall
1998 CPI + x 2.0% 4.0 Nil Nil Nil
1999 1.7 Nil Nil Nil
2000 2.4 1.5 2.4 1.7
2001 1.5% 2.8 1.3 Nil 1.0
2002 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.3
2003 1.1 Nil Nil Nil
2004 2.0 Nil Nil Nil
2005 0.5 CPI + 0.5 WI – x 0.3% 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
2006 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
2007 1.8 1.8 Nil 1.1
2008 1.5% 3.0 0.7 0.7 0.7
2009 4.8 −1.9 −1.3 −1.6
2010 −2.5 −3.1 −1.9 −2.5
2011 2.8 1.6 0.3 1.0
2012 No fare increase due to fare review
2013 0.4 cCPI + 0.4 WI + 0.2 EI - x 0.5% 6.6a 3.2
2014 2.8b 2.8
2015 −1.9 −1.9
2016 −5.7 −4.2c
2017
Notes: CPI refers to the change in the consumer price index in the preceding year.
WI refers to the change in the national average monthly earnings in the preceding year, adjusted for any change in the employer’s contribution to the Central Provident
Fund.
cCPI refers to Core CPI which excludes items such as housing prices, cost of private transport, and items accounted for in the Energy Index.
EI is an energy index for tracking energy cost changes.
a Combined cap of 2012 and 2013, 3.2% awarded in 2013 with 3.4% rollover to 2014.
b 2.8% comprises 3.4% rollover from 2013 plus −0.6% for 2014.
c With −1.5% rollover to 2017.
10 The ﬁscal constraint on the current government was put in place in 1991 when the Singapore Constitution was amended to include an Elected President who,
among other responsibilities, would have ﬁnancial responsibilities regarding Singapore’s reserves (Centre for Liveable Cities, 2014).
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and there is therefore no direct link between urban rail ﬁnancing and LVC.
Industry structure: In the late 1990s, Singapore restructured from a fully state-owned urban rail transit system to one where the
ownership of infrastructure was separated from rolling stock and operations. In 1998, capital was injected into the state-owned
operator SMRT to buy over the operating assets, and its licence to operate train services was extended via a new 30-year licence and
operating agreement (LOA). In addition, a lease and maintenance agreement (LMA) was established between the SMRT and the LTA
for the infrastructure such as stations, tracks, viaducts, and depots (Looi and Choi, 2016).
SMRT was listed on the Singapore stock exchange in 2000, becoming the ﬁrst urban rail transit operator in the world to be
privatised through a share issue privatization exercise. The government investment holding company, Temasek Holdings, however,
retained majority ownership and control of the company. The restructuring was also horizontal as the concession to operate a new
line (the North-East Line) was awarded to the dominant bus company SBS Transit in 1999 through a closed quality tender limited to
the two incumbent bus operators (SBS Transit and TIBS). In 2001, the restructuring of the transit industry into a multi-modal duopoly
was completed when the rail company SMRT acquired TIBS (Phang, 2007). In 2002, the government further amended the Rapid
Transit Systems legislation to strengthen its regulatory powers over rail licensees (Looi and Choi, 2016). This licensing model re-
placed the earlier LOA contractual arrangement and gave the government legislative powers to modify licence terms and conditions.
Privatization and subsequent leadership changes at SMRT however contributed to weaknesses in the rail system. In 2002, a CEO
with retail sector background and no previous experience in urban rail transit operations was appointed. The leadership change led to
SMRT’s new focus on conversion of previously underutilised spaces at stations to retail and commercial spaces. The result was a
signiﬁcant increase in proﬁts from rental of station properties for SMRT. The increased proﬁtability of the SMRT however contributed
to a reluctance by the PTC to grant fare increases for rail (see Table 4). For the decade between 2003 and 2012, there were 2 years of
decreases, 4 years of zero increase, 2 years of below 1% increase for rail fares.
Rapid population increases from 4.4 million in 2006 to 5.2 million by 2011 placed a major strain on transit services.
Overcrowding in buses and trains, with far longer than expected waiting times during peak hours caused much unhappiness amongst
commuters. On 15 Dec 2011, SMRT experienced its ﬁrst major breakdown aﬀecting about 127,000 commuters. A second major
breakdown two days later caused the Prime Minister to launch a Committee of Inquiry (COI) to study the causes and emergency
preparedness of SMRT to deal with breakdowns.11 Amongst other ﬁndings, the COI report viewed LTA’s regulatory oversight over
SMRT’s rail maintenance and capital improvement of infrastructure to have been inadequate.12 Despite greater government attention
since to increasing transit capacity and improving rail reliability, service breakdowns continued with 14 major disruptions in 2014
and an additional 29 disruptions in 2015 (Gomez-Ibanez and Goh, 2016).
On 15 July 2016, the government announced that LTA would pay SMRT S$1.06 billion for SMRT’s rail operating assets.13 As part
of the agreement, the new licence was shortened to 15 years (Business Times, 16 July 2016). This announcement was followed less
than a week later by the announcement that Temasek Holdings, the government’s investment holding company, and SMRT’s largest
shareholder with a 54 percent stake, would spend S$1.18 billion to buy the remaining shares of SMRT and delist the ﬁrm (Straits
Times, 21 July 2016). The oﬀer was accepted by minority shareholders and SMRT was delisted on the stock exchange from 1
November 2016. Although this was communicated as taking SMRT ‘private’ through delisting, in eﬀect it was the government
resuming 100% ownership of SMRT through its investment holding company.
In summary, the Singapore government was able to capture land value increments from urban rail transit development through
sale of state land leases and development charges for land use changes. However, there was no direct link between LVC and rail
development as rail capital investments were ﬁnanced through the government’s general budget. The PPP structure vertically se-
parated infrastructure from rolling stock ownership, operations and maintenance, privatising the latter. Strict fare cap regulation
exposed the private sector operators to both costs and revenue risks. The rail sector does not capture land value increments directly
and operators are also limited and unequal in their ability to cross-subsidise rail operations from rental proﬁts. Frequent train
breakdowns from 2011 eventually led to a major and ongoing restructuring of the rail sector. SMRT’s sixteen-year history from 100%
state-owned to a company listed on Singapore’s stock exchange and back to fully state-owned corporation reveals weaknesses in the
vertically separated PPP model used and is in stark contrast to Hong Kong’s integrated MTRCL which has grown from strength to
strength.
3.4. Beijing
Beijing, the second largest Chinese city, has a population of 22 million people in 2015. Like much of China, the city experienced
rapid economic growth and urbanization in the past three decades. To facilitate the economic and population growth, the city’s
transportation system has undergone a major transformation in the past two decades. Its metro network has expanded rapidly since
2000. After winning the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics in the summer of 2001, the city government moved quickly to expand
the city’s metro system. As a result, Beijing’s metro system quadrupled in length, from two lines at 54 km in 2000 to eight lines at
200 km by 2008.14
11 These two major breakdowns led to the resignation of the SMRT CEO and the eventual appointment of a former Chief of Defence Force to lead the SMRT.
12 See COI 2012 report at https://www.mot.gov.sg/news/COI%20report%20-%20Executive%20Summary.pdf.
13 In a 2008 comprehensive review of the sector, the Land Transport Master Plan had proposed for rail operating licences to be shortened to about 15 years to
provide a ‘more eﬀective threat of contestability to the incumbent operator’, with the LTA owning the operating assets instead of the operators. This new framework
was put in place for the Downtown Line operating tender in 2010. The LTA had also begun negotiations with the existing operators to re-purchase their operating
assets.
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During that period of rapid expansion and given increasing urban congestion and air pollution, Beijing shifted its policy to
promoting public transportation rather than road expansion. The speed of Beijing’s metro construction increased after 2008 due to
ﬁscal stimulus policy adopted by the government in the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis. According to oﬃcial statistics, Beijing’s
metro network expanded to 18 lines with 554 km of track in operation by 2015. Annual passenger trips for the metro network in 2015
reached 3.32 billion, with the metro mode share exceeding 20 percent of total trips. The city continues to build more metro lines,
with a target of 30 lines and 1177 km network in operation by 2020.15 Table 5 summarizes the city’s population growth and metro
network expansion since 2000.
Industry re-structuring: To prepare for the Olympics, Beijing restructured its metro regime in 2003. Three city-owned enterprises
are responsible for metro investment, construction and operations (Wang, 2005). The Beijing government plays the leading role and
is responsible for metro planning, regulation, coordination, and supervision. The Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation (BIIC)
is responsible for metro ﬁnance and investment. As the Beijing government did not have suﬃcient resources to support massive metro
expansion in early 2000, BIIC raised metro development funds through various channels, including bank debt, issue of corporate
bonds, private equity, and through a PPP model (Chang, 2013).
To implement the PPP model in Beijing’s metro system, the Beijing MTR Corporation (BMTRC) was founded in 2005. The joint
venue company comprised three shareholders: BIIC, the China Capital Group (a state-owned enterprise for infrastructure develop-
ment), and the Hong Kong MTR. As Chinese law requires that Chinese investors must hold at least 51% of the joint venture company,
BIIC holds 2% of BMTRC shares, the China Capital Group holds 49%, and the remaining 49% is held by the private sector partner, the
Hong Kong MTR Corporation.
The ﬁrst PPP was implemented for the No.4 line in 2006. The No. 4 line is 29 km long and built at an estimated cost of RMB
15.3 billion. The total investment comprised two parts; the civil works and the rolling stock. The civil works component accounts for
two thirds of the total investment, and was ﬁnanced by BIIC. The second part (cars, signals, power systems) was ﬁnanced, constructed
and operated by the BMTRC. BMTRC bore the entire investment, operation and maintenance costs. After 30 years of operation,
BMTRC is required to transfer ownership of the line to the public sector at no additional costs (Wang, 2005). By foregoing the
operating revenue, the public sector saves on one third of the initial investment, as well as on-going maintenance and operating costs.
Fare adjustment: BMTRC receives all revenues from fares and advertisements. The public and private sector partners established a
revenue and risk sharing mechanism for the operation of the No. 4 PPP line. Chang (2013) described this mechanism in detail. In
brief, both partners agreed to a shadow fare price and shadow patronage, with these numbers to be adjusted every three years. Based
on these ﬁgures, both parties established a revenue ﬂoor and ceiling. If the actual revenue is lower than the revenue ﬂoor, the public
sector will subsidise BMTRC the amount up to the revenue ﬂoor. If the actual revenue is above the predetermined ceiling, the public
sector partner will share the extra proﬁt with BMTRC. In this way, BMTRC is able to reduce its demand risks - such as revenue risk
from unfavourable fare changes and ridership risk from competition from other modes.
The PPP agreement for the No. 4 line was eﬀective in 2006. In October 2007, the Beijing government adjusted the fare rate to a
ﬂat rate of 2 RMB per trip. Since then, the Beijing metro has incurred serious operating deﬁcits. For example, the Beijing government
provided subsidies of 3.69 billion RMB to the Beijing metro system in 2012.16 However, the interests of BMTRC were protected by the
PPP agreement, and BMTRC enjoyed proﬁts from the operation of the No. 4 line.
Given the substantial operating deﬁcit and the safety concerns raised by an overwhelmingly large number of passengers, Beijing
readjusted the metro fare rate in December 28, 2014.17 The new fare ranges from RMB 3 to 9 depending on the distance travelled.
Table 5
Beijing’s population growth and metro network expansion.
Sources: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Government/Departments/t1028337.htm); and Beijing Municipal Commission of
Transport (http://www.bjjtw.gov.cn/).
Population (million) Metro route line (km) Number of lines in operation Annual passenger trips (billion) Metro mode share in total trips
2000 13.6 54 2 0.4 4%
2005 15.4 114 4 0.7 6%
2006 16.0 114 4 0.7 6%
2007 16.8 142 4 0.7 7%
2008 17.7 200 8 1.2 8%
2009 18.6 228 9 1.4 10%
2010 19.6 336 14 1.8 12%
2011 20.2 372 15 2.2 14%
2012 20.7 442 16 2.5 17%
2013 21.1 465 17 3.2 21%
2014 21.5 527 18 3.4 19%
2015 21.7 544 18 3.3 25%
Note: The metro mode share in total transit refers to number of metro passenger trips among daily passenger trips.
14 Beijing Statistical Year Book 2009.
15 The National Development and Reform Commission approved Beijing’s 2015–2021 metro development plan on Sep 14, 2015. See: http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/
gzdt/201509/t20150929_753197.html.
16 Jingxin News, January 23, 2013. Access at: http://money.163.com/13/0123/02/8LSCMQ0300253B0H.html.
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The average fare rate was estimated to be RMB 4.3 per trip,18 an increase of over 115% from the ﬂat 2 RMB rate. However, the
number of passengers declined by just 4% in 2015 compared with levels under ﬂat rate in 2014. The government enjoyed substantial
savings from the reduction in subsidies for the metro. BMTRC’s operating net proﬁts (after tax) increased from 185 million HKD in
2014 to 236 million HKD in 2015, despite a 4% decline in the number of passengers.19
Under the PPP arrangement, the private sector was given strong incentives to reduce costs. Chang (2013) provides detailed
illustrations of how the BMTRC reduced its ﬁnancial and operating costs. Cost savings, however, has not been at the expense of
quality of services provided. The private sector brought HK MTRC’s professional rail management expertise into the operation of the
No.4 line. For instance, the actual punctuality rate of the No.4 line was 99.4%, compared with 90% on other public sector operated
lines. Beyond the social beneﬁts, Chang (2013) estimated savings at 9.4% of expenses by using PPP model for the No. 4 line. Also, the
PPP line was likely to have generated knowledge spill-overs to other public sector operated lines, resulting in cost savings and service
improvements through better management. Given the win-win situation for the PPP on the No. 4 line, more PPP lines were im-
plemented by Beijing MTR with similar revenue and risk sharing arrangement between public and private, as shown in Table 6.
In summary, the urban rail PPP model used in Beijing was viewed as successful. The entire metro system is under the control of
the public sector. The PPP joint venture company also has a public nature, as 51% of BMTRC’s shares are held by public entities. This
facilitated the vertical integration of the PPP line into the overall network, and all lines share the same fare scheme to avoid price
competition between the public sector and PPP lines. The revenue and risk sharing scheme is also crucial for the success of the Beijing
metro PPP arrangement. By transferring the revenue risk, the private sector was incentivise to improve on the quality of service to
attract more passengers. Indeed, Hong Kong MTR brought entrepreneurship into metro operations and management, with social and
ﬁnancial beneﬁt spill-overs for the public sector and commuters. However, unlike Hong Kong, there is no explicit link between LVC
and rail development. If Beijing further adopts LVC for urban rail development, the PPP model in Beijing will bring even more
beneﬁts.
4. Lessons learned from East Asian cities
East Asian cities have had diverse experiences in involving the private sector in urban rail transit development and operations.
Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore have had decades of experience, while Chinese cities are mostly new-comers. In cities where the
public sector does not have the necessary expertise in urban rail development and operations, an experienced private sector partner
can help provide expertise, reduce learning and operating costs and improve eﬃciency. At the same time, public sector companies
operating alongside private sector companies are able to learn from the practices of private companies such as has happened in
Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen.
The experiences of East Asian cities in urban transit systems show that urban rail PPP performance is sensitive to successful land
value capture. LVC can be an important revenue source to support urban rail development. Many cities in East Asia have favourable
conditions to apply LVC instruments to ﬁnance urban rail developments given their high population densities. The fundamental
diﬀerence of LVC instruments as applied in Hong Kong and Tokyo is largely due to diﬀerences in land ownership. However, LVC also
depends on local public policy contexts given similar land leasehold systems in Hong Kong, Singapore and cities in Mainland China.
The experiences of Hong Kong and Tokyo suggest that private participation in development-based LVC could further enhance land
values as the private sector has strong incentives to work with the public sector to integrate the development projects with the city’s
existing and future land use plans. Certainly, successful LVC is also dependent on organisational structure as well as management
expertise.
While fare revenue is important, it is subsidiary to other sources of ﬁnancing over time. In particular, a vertically integrated PPP
that extends into real estate development as well as fare adjustment mechanisms impact upon revenue risks and long run sustain-
ability. ‘Super-vertically’ integrated systems such as have evolved in Japan and Hong Kong have been able to generate multiple
streams of revenue for cross-subsidisation of urban rail operations. However, these private-owned and operated vertically integrated
systems have evolved organically in a complex historical context that are not easy to replicate in other settings.
Table 6
Existing PPP lines operated by Beijing MTR.
Source: Beijing MTR website (http://www.mtr.bj.cn/).
Length (km) Number of
stations
Year operations
started
Total investment
(RMB Billion)
Private Investment
(RMB Billion)
Duration of Operation and
Maintenance Licence
No.4 line 28 24 2009 15.3 4.6 30 years
No.4 line extension
(Daxing line)
22 11 2010 10.9 0 10 years
No. 14 line 47 37 2013 50.0 15 30 years
No. 16 line 50 29 2016 47.4 15 30 years
17 China News, December 28, 2014. Access at: http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/12-28/6917334.shtml.
18 Beijing Times, Oct 29, 2014. Access at: http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2014-10/29/content_138189.htm.
19 In 2014 and 2015, the exchange rate of RMB to HKD was around 1:1.22. Figures are from the Hong Kong MTR 2015 Financial Reports. Access at: http://www.
mtr.com.hk/en/corporate/investor/ﬁnancialinfo.html#02.
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Singapore’s experience illustrates that vertical unbundled PPPs could cut oﬀ avenues for cross-subsidisation, reduce information
ﬂows as well as economies of scale and scope, introduce principal agent problems, and result in underinvestment in capital stock and
maintenance. Reliance on farebox recovery alone to ﬁnance operations for overly long in Singapore’s case also contributed to sys-
temic weaknesses in the urban metro system.
Overall, our case studies show clearly that fare regulation, land value capture mechanisms and vertical structure are not stand
alone policy decisions but interact in important ways that impact on rail performance and sustainability. Table 7 summarizes how
vertical structure, LVC mechanisms and fare regulation diﬀer in these four cities.
Despite diﬀerences in ownership structures, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Beijing have essentially adopted vertically integrated systems.
The super-vertically integrated R+P systems ensure that both metro development (as well as operations) and real estate development
(and operations) are fully in sync with city planning, which is vital for successful development based LVC. Both vertical integration
(city planning level rather than PPP level) and development based LVC work synergistically to maintain or create stable passenger
ﬂows, which can increase the fare revenue.
East Asian cities’ large populations and high densities imply that systems tend to be heavy metros rather than light rail-light metro
systems. Co-ordination of heavy metros operation is highly complex especially given the high train densities in East Asian cities. The
technical complexity of large and high density networks favours vertical integration. The super integrated system not only reduces
coordination cost, but more importantly facilitates highest and best land use decisions, promotes public transit usage and reduces
gridlock, externalities and uncertainty.
The experiences of East Asian cities lend support to arguments that favour vertically integrated rail transit systems as opposed to
vertically unbundled systems. How to integrate land value capture and fare adjustment mechanisms, and how the incentives of
private sector partners can be better aligned with the public sector partner through these mechanisms need to be considered carefully
in PPP design. We conclude that the optimal structure for heavy metros is a vertically integrated public-owned and driven system,
with the public sector entering into selective partnerships with the private sector where risk sharing is clearly deﬁned and allocated.
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